This paper maps the evolution of the European Union as an external democratization actor, identifying four critical junctures that have proven to be essential in delimiting the approach the EU has taken qua external democratization. These are (i) the end of the Cold War, (ii) the 2004 EU enlargement to the East, (iii) the signing of the Lisbon Treaty, and (iv) the events surrounding the Arab Spring in conjunction with the European economic crisis. This paper maintains that whereas the first years of the post-Cold War period were characteristic for their normative optimism concerning the support of democratic developments in the EU's near and far abroad, the European Union -and its individual member states -has recently emphasized more material/strategic aspects to the Union's external democratization policy. Consequently, this contribution outlines the main dimensions of the approach Brussels developed with regard to external democratization in the last two and a half decades. It concludes by calling for further empirical research to be conducted to assess the extent to which the EU's external democratization efforts vis-à-vis specific countries and regions is in line with the Normative Power Europe framework put forward by Ian Manners.
Introduction
When Ian Manners argued in 2002 that the concept of normative power is 'an attempt to suggest that not only [was] the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics,' 1 he had a profound impact on European integration scholarship. As such, he opened space in the debate of what it meant to be normative and what the constitutive elements of the European Union's alleged normativism were, and prompted scholars to carefully distinguish between the European Union (EU) as a normative, civilian, and civilizing power.
2 Consequently, while these ideas were at times attacked for being too ideational and indifferent of the more materialist aspects of the EU's foreign policy, 3 Manners' Normative Power Europe (NPE) framework still provides us with a valuable conceptual prism through which to assess how the EU acts in the "world out there."
Concerning the constitutive elements of the European Union's normativism, few scholars would disagree that its democratic credentials is one of the most essential ones. Furthermore, few would disagree that the strengthening of democratic principles -next to creating greater interdependence between the EU member states -has been the devised strategy for creating sustainable peace within the European Union (and on the European soil more generally); a strategy bearing fruit judging by the absence of major conflict between the member states. Yet, the extent to which the democratic foundations at home have been translated into active democracy promotion abroad is less obvious . This seems rather paradoxical -or at least Manners would have us believewith the NPE framework predicting that what the EU is also determines what it does in the international arena. Taking this puzzle as its starting point, this contribution hopes to add to the literature on the EU's external democratization efforts in three ways. First, it wishes to establish the applicability of a Normative Power Europe prism to the study of the European Union's external democratization policy. Second, by mapping the evolution of the European Union as an external democratization actor, the paper wants to identify the most essential critical junctures that can be said to have changed the EU's approach qua external democratization, whether in terms of policymaking, institution-building, or the EU's motivation for promoting democracy abroad (normative pragmatic rationale). As such, this paper identifies four such critical junctures; (i) the end of the Cold The paper is structured in the following way. After these introductory remarks, the stage is set by outlining the conceptual framework of Manners' Normative Power Europe that guides the remainder of this research. This is followed by a historical overview of the -admittedly -limited external democratization activities the European Union has undertaken in the shadow of the Cold War. The third part discusses the first two identified critical junctures, by mapping the evolution of the European Union's external democratization agenda between the early 1990s and the 2004 EU enlargement, distinguishing between democracy promotion as an inseparable part of its enlargement policy and its incrementally developing foreign policy proper. Such an approach is continued in the fourth part, only this time focusing on the remaining two critical junctures. The discussion of the third and fourth parts enables us -in the final, fifth part -to identify several aspects of the approach the EU developed qua external democratization. Finally, the concluding section summarizes the main findings before drawing more general implications for the Normative Power Europe framework.
Normative Power Europe as a Conceptual Prism
According to Manners, the European Union's normative character is predominantly based upon five core norms -peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights -and further supported by four minor norms (social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development, and good governance). 4 Based upon these, Manners develops the idea of Europe as a normative power, arguing that such a reconceptualization of what the European Union is has three specific implications; an ontological, a positivist, and a normative one: '[presenting] the EU as a normative power has an ontological quality to it -that the EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a positivist quantity to itthat the EU acts to change norms in the international system; and a normative quality to itthat the EU should act to extend its norms into the international system.'
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While the reader should remain critical as to the extent to which the identified core and minor norms have been internalized by the EU's population and thus constitute the EU's identity, it is the second 3 and third aspect of the Normative Power Europe framework -namely its external applicability -that is of interest to this paper. Yet, what does it mean to behave in a normative way? How is the European Union to act in order to impact often deeply-routed belief systems in third countries?
Manners' answer centers on norm diffusion, which is shaped by six factors; (i) contagion, (ii) information diffusion, (iii) procedural diffusion, (iv) transference, (v) overt diffusion, and (vi) the cultural filter. 6 In a somewhat simplified way, the process of norm diffusion has played a central role in the work of Finnemore and Sikkink, who discuss a norm's "life cycle" from norm emergence, over norm cascade, to norm internalization: During the first stage, the role of norm entrepreneurs -agents (in our case the European Union) who want to convince a larger group of states to embrace a new norm -is highlighted. As such, the norm's "life cycle" begins at the domestic (in our case the EU) level, where the emergence of the norm can be motivated, among others, by 'empathy, altruism, and ideational commitment.' 8 Subsequently, the agent utilizes such mechanisms as language and persuasion to frame and spread the norm among a larger group of recipients. Once a large enough group of countries has accepted the new norm, this then begins to cascade and is being diffused among an even larger group of countries. This process of norm diffusion, defined as the 'transfer or transmission of objects, processes, ideas and information from one population or region to another,' 9 creates much empirical controversy as the factors motivating it are rather unclear. 10 On the one hand, social constructivists maintain that through mechanisms such as socialization and social learning, agents adopt the norm because they start believing in its appropriateness with the norm ultimately having cognitive effects.
On the other hand -and equally plausible -agents might adopt the norm for purely strategic reasons, following the logic of consequentiality, with the norm altering the agent's behavior only. In the final stage, the agent might internalize the norm, effectively taking it for granted. Yet, should not a large enough group of actors accept the norm, preventing norm diffusion and cascading, the norm, instead of becoming internalized, might dissolve.
While this study is not concerned with the motivations behind potential norm adoption by third countries, the NPE's perceived "pacifism" stands out and merits a closer look. Put simply, the question arises whether the absence of any punitive mechanisms in promoting the EU's norms As a result, the early EU's human rights and democratization agenda -if one can even be spoken off -was internal, self-explanatory, and remained non-institutionalized. In fact, human rights and democratization enjoyed such low profile within the European Communities that it was not until the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration on European Identity that the principles upon which a European identity was being formed were made explicit. The then nine member states reiterated that they were 'determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice -which is the ultimate goal of economic progress -and of respect for human rights.' 15 Yet, while the Communities thus specified which underlying values would inform its internal identity, it
did not yet give rise to an outward-geared human rights and/or democratization policy.
Consequently, this lack of an external human rights and democratization dimension has inhibited the European Communities from assuming an active role in bringing about democratic transition in the three post-dictatorial states readying for membership in the late 1970s and early 1980s -Greece, Portugal, and Spain. 16 Certainly, their membership perspective was crucial for accelerating the establishment and observance of democratic processes, but the Communities -lacking other than declaratory tools to support their efforts -was not the causal factor in the three countries' speedy democratization. Rather, it has served as a catalyst, to which Athens, Lisbon, and Madrid looked as a buttress for democratization. While it has become evident that the European Communities would only enlarge by democratic countries, it was everything but a conscious human rights-and democracy-promoting international actor.
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Becoming a Conscious External Democratization Actor
With regard to the European Union's external human rights and democratization policy, the end of the Cold War cannot be interpreted as anything short of the first critical juncture in the EU's development of a conscious external democratization policy. While the European Union predominantly focused on developing an effective external human rights policy to be tackled in an across-pillar fashion, prompting some to speak of an outright 'rights turn,' 18 another trajectory began to run its course through the EU's institutional framework. Put simply, the end of the Cold War created an environment in which both individual member states and the EU as a whole began to toy with the idea of promoting democracy abroad. While, read in light of the post-Cold War context, where the 'end of history' predicted a widely supported spread of liberal democracies to the detriment of the few remaining autocratic/dictatorial regimes, such a quest does not seem surprising, the operationalization of developing a streamlined external democratization policy soon proved to be anything but simple.
The first hurdle that needed to be overcome consisted of finding common grounds among the individual EU member stated on a more philosophical matter, namely the extent to which democracy as a political system could be promoted in the first place. Whereas some scholars, in a neo-Hegelian fashion, argued that democracy has emerged as a result of a long and dialectical historical process and as such was context-specific, 19 others warned outright of a backlash against the west should it attempt to impose its own liberalizing policy in third countries. Nevertheless, rather than finding an answer to these philosophical puzzles, the EU was soon forced to push such conceptual considerations to the background and react to the political realities as they were developing on the ground. Concretely, the first litmus test of whether the European Union would be able to diffuse its internal norm of democracy in third countries consisted of preparing the ever-growing number of newly independent and sovereign countries of Central and Eastern Europe for EU membership. Whereas we were able to conclude above that with regard to preparing Greece, Portugal, and Spain for EU accession in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the European Union did not play an active role in bringing about democratic transformation, the sheer magnitude and specificity of the approaching Eastern enlargement called for a much revised approach on Brussels' part. Particularly after the Union was vividly reminded of the political instability in its own backyard in the form of the secessionist wars in former Yugoslavia, the urgency with which the European Union would need to address the democratic deficiencies of the applicant countries east of its borders increased. Consequently, already at the June 1993 European Council summit in Copenhagen -and thus well before the first CEEC would submit its membership application -the European Union outlined the criteria for membership. The very first criterion, commonly referred to as political, stipulated that 'membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.' 21 In essence, the EU thereby established the instrument of conditionality; the speed with which the candidate country would be approaching the ultimate carrot (EU membership) would be conditioned by the progress it would achieve with regard to the established criteria.
Yet, relying on conditionality only was perceived as not necessarily bringing about the coveted positive change in the target countries 22 and as such the European Union developed several positive measures to accompany conditionality. Democracy assistance, as it became known, differed depending on the target country. Where basic democratic institutions had already been established, the European Union would provide both technical and financial assistance to strengthen these. In non-democratic states, the EU would aim at 'carving out a degree of autonomous "political space"
within which opposition to the authoritarian regime could take root,' 23 by -in essence -relying on the cooperation of local civil society. In practice, however, the EU's external democratization policy in the early 1990s was primarily aimed at the many candidate countries east of its borders, which by the time of their application for EU membership exhibited the most fundamental traits of a democratic political system. Consequently, the EU's early democratization policy became closely Particularly the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 stands as testimony of the earlier felt normative ambiguity -defined by the EU setting out to democratize its neighbourhood throughout the 1990s on the one hand, yet failing to develop a consistent approach on the other hand -being reflected in new policy-making. Democracy, to be specific, was treated as a prerequisite for political stability, social and economic development and as such regarded as a means to the achievement of greater goals, rather than being seen as an end goal in its own rights.
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Of little surprise then is the fact that the question of just how democratic developments are to be supported in the many partner countries is not explicitly -nor implicitly -posed at all. Interestingly, though, when studying the bilateral treaties signed between the EU on the one and the respective ENP partner country on the other hand, each ENP Action Plan was more specific as to the democratic changes that would need to occur in the respective country if it wishes to intensify its relationship Union is devising strategies of how to mold the neighbouring countries' political systems in accordance with its own normative believe system should be read as testimony of the Union's increasing confidence in being able to shape the international arena.
From Normative Optimism to Materialism? The EU's External Democratization Efforts since 2007
So far in this article, we have focused mainly on democracy promotion and human rights within the EU itself and as part of the process of enlargement. In those cases, processes of conditionality, the benefits of joining the EU, were a strong component of success. We now turn to promotion beyond the area of likely enlargement, to other countries and regions of the world where the ideational arguments offered by Manners likely play a larger role. Nonetheless, notions of conditionality continue from the EU side in a different form, for example by offering beneficial bilateral agreements with the EU, for example in trade or developmental aid projects.
At the beginning of this article, we put forth the thesis that critical junctures have taken place with regards to EU promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. We identified the end of the Cold War as one such juncture, where the EU began to use conditionality to carefully promote democracy in East Central Europe to prepare for the enlargement of the EU. This was followed by a critical juncture for the EU, after enlargement, when attention was turned to focus on the stability in the regions bordering the EU, with the focus on the Neighborhood Policy. Gradually new institutional mechanisms were created to coordinate foreign policy, not only in the immediate neighborhood, but also in EU policy toward the wider world. These institutional developments, which were formalized in the Lisbon Treaty which was signed in 2007, and entered into force in December 2009, may be seen as a critical juncture for the EU by strengthening its institutional mechanism to act abroad, also in the promotion of democracy and human rights. Here the EU began to focus more on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and democracy promotion and human rights became a common denominator which could serve as the basis of CFSP among the member states. In addition, in agreements outlining the relationship between the EU and countries beyond Europe, in both trade and aid agreements, democracy and human rights were included.
This period after EU enlargement (2004) 
The Five Dimensions of the EU's External Democratization Approach
What we propose to do in the remainder of this article is to first delineate the various approaches that the EU uses to advance the promotion of democracy and human rights. Below we group these into five categories, (i) direct EU democracy and human rights programs, (ii) indirect support through economic change, (iii) EU support for UN processes, (iv) EU support for other regional international bodies (Council of Europe and the OSCE), and (v) EU cooperation with member states' promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. The approaches, instruments and tools used for this process vary by region and country. Following this list, space does not permit an exhaustive empirical review of how each of these approaches is used in practice, but some initial discussion is provided. -A view that economic reform and administrative capacity building in market creation would spillover to broader political reform -Assistance for good governance, broadened over time to be seen as contributing to broad democratizing dynamics
EU policies and programs supporting democracy and human rights
EU support for UN processes
-EU involvement and attention paid to the process and recommendations of the UN Periodic Review Process -EU support for the development of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs)
EU support for international regional bodies, especially the Council of Europe and OSCE initiatives on democracy and human rights
EU multi-level governance and coordination of promotion efforts with the member states -Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
-In addition to these EU level policies, policies and practices of EU member states abroad in supporting democracy and human rights are an integral component
EU policies and programs supporting democracy and human rights
After a fuller analysis, it will be interesting to see how the EU's use of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights has changed from the third period we have identified, from the initial optimism and normative framing of this foreign policy area following EU enlargement, to the more material and skeptical period following the collapse of the Arab spring and the rise of the European economic crisis. It will also be interesting to see how the EU Electoral Observation Missions have changed over time, from an early focus on election day and counting of the ballots, to a longer term monitoring perspective including the run up to the election in the campaign period and the democratic rights of assembly, speech, and access to the media to communicate with voters in this critical democratic period.
But at this time, here we will focus more on the mainstreaming of democracy and human rights in EU development cooperation. In this article, we have linked the promotion of democracy and human rights. This is also what has occurred at the policy level in the field of development cooperation. For example, the European Commission has prepared a programming guide for the preparation of strategy papers prepared for partner countries which states 'Democracy and the protection of human rights are inextricably linked...' 28 This is a policy area that the Commission has integrated and mainstreamed into all areas of policy making with partner countries, including trade and external assistance. The Commission sets forth a policy that prior to any country programming, the process of democratization and respect for human rights in a country is to be analyzed, directing particular attention to the information available in the EU's Human Rights Fact Sheets kept in a protected Council web-site and Head of Mission (HoM) reports on recent development, reports produced by UN human rights bodies, and the Amnesty International Library. 29 It also directs attention for analysis to the institutional framework and government policies, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of civil society and political parties toward democracy and human rights.
The guide places particular stress on seeking information about the 'most vulnerable and It should be noted that there has been a certain backlash by governments against democracy promotion efforts at times. For example, the EU in its relationship agreement with Ethiopia provides support for institutional development promoting democracy and human rights, for example in measures aimed at the development of the judiciary and the national parliament. But these measures also provide support for civil society development. Recently Ethiopia has attempted to curb the role of NGOs in the country by requiring NGOs that receive funding from abroad to refrain from certain activities and activism. 32 Thus, at times countries attempt to restrict the ability of the EU and other international actors in promoting democracy and human rights abroad. 
Economic approach, reform and trade, the indirect approach
In a review of this approach, the arguments of scholars and policymakers concerning the democratic spill-over from economic reform measures can be discussed. Furthermore, the trajectory of broadening good governance and rule of law measures to include democracy promotion can be discussed in greater detail.
EU support for UN processes
We next want to turn our attention to the EU's use of United Nations mechanisms to further strengthen its support for democracy and human rights. A recent report prepared for the European Parliament concludes that while the EU has been active in presenting proposal for review by the UN's Human Rights Council (HRC), the influence of the EU has been mixed, and that the agenda and The EU has also been involved in strengthening the system of National Human Rights 
EU support for regional mechanisms, Council of Europe and OSCE initiatives on democracy and human rights
Part of the EU's and of the member states' support for democracy and human rights is channeled through the support for other regional institutions like the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
EU multi-level governance
Once again, in an overall analysis of the support for democracy and human rights abroad, the policies and practices of individual member states also are important.
These are the five dimensions to the approach that the EU and the member states have employed to pursue the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. The mix of these approaches and particular policies pursued by country and region vary in term of Manner's normative and material focuses during the different policy eras following a critical juncture. At the end of this article, we wish to mention one region in particular to give an example of the changing EU policy over time, and to underscore that EU policy does not happen in a vacuum, but exists in cooperation and competition with other international actors.
The EU's Democratization Efforts vis-à-vis ASEAN
Thus, now we would like to turn our attention to one region, Southeast Asia and its regional organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), a relatively new geographic area and organization for EU engagement, but one that is growing in interest because of new trade links and the competition with China for influence in the region. Here it is apparent that a strategy consolidating democracy in some countries and promoting reforms in non-democratic countries is necessary. The strategy of the EU toward ASEAN needs to be geared both to the democratic and nondemocratic states in the region, and to bilateral measures to assist the further consolidation of democracy in the democratic states. Commentators have noted that given the limited scope of a democracy agenda within ASEAN, '(T)he EU could focus on less sensitive issues such as the strengthening of governance capacity, combating corruption, humanitarian relief, disaster management and promoting bureaucratic reform.' 42 In terms of a bilateral approach to the more democratic members 'the EU needs to go beyond human rights and electoral assistance to work on key issues such as strengthening the party system, the role of parliaments, security sector reform (with a special focus on military reform), legal reform, and the role of the media and civil society Thus, in any analysis of EU promotion of democracy and human rights in a particular country of region, the involvement of other strong international actors must also be taken into account. In addition, changing international circumstances have resulted in the balance between a normative focus on foreign policy and more material factors of economic growth and security must be taken into account.
Conclusion
The value added of this contribution is threefold. The first section concentrates on outlining Manners' Normative Power Europe framework and asks whether the European Union, in its external democracy promotion policy, constitutes such a normative actor. To answer this question, the paper thereafter focuses on understanding the EU's evolution as an external democratization actor. It identifies four critical junctures that have determined Brussels' approach qua external democratization. The first is the end of the Cold War, after which the European Union experienced a period of normative ambiguity where, in line with the overall 'end of history' spirit, it set out to democratize its (near) abroad, yet fell short of streamlining such a policy into the remaining EU policy areas. Thus, while we can speak of a certain normative optimism in the early 1990s, the EU's external democratization policy only really found anchoring as part of its enlargement policy. The second 43 Ibid., : 4. 44 Carol Giacomo, "Obama Turns to Asia," (New York: New York Times, 23 April 2014).
critical juncture was then constituted by the 2004 EU enlargement to the East. This was not only due to the fact that the "preparing-the-East-for-accession" chapter has come to an end, but also because it stood as testimony to the new democratizing challenges East and South of the new member states.
Duly realizing the complexity of the task at hand, Brussels devised several new policy strategies vis-à-vis the new neighbourhood, with the most prominent one being the European Neighbourhood
Policy. The third juncture, namely the institutionalization of the approach adopted by the EU so far, mainly in the form of the Treaty of Lisbon, led to external democratization being firmly anchored inamong others -the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. Finally, the observed normative optimism to some extent retreated in favor of a more "materialist" approach as a reaction to the EU's failures to bring about specific democratic change in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, further amplified by the European economic crisis that forced individual member states to prioritize other policies over the EU's normativism.
The third part of this paper briefly discusses five dimensions that can be identified as constituting the EU's approach to external democratization Brussels has devised over the last two and a half decades. These dimensions are (i) direct EU democracy and human rights programs, (ii)
indirect support through economic change, (iii) EU support for UN processes, (iv) EU support for other regional international bodies (Council of Europe and the OSCE), and (v) EU cooperation with member states' promotion of democracy and human rights abroad. Consequently, such a listing of the dimensions leads us to answer the main question raised in this paper in a rather ambiguous manner. Certainly, some of the mechanisms and tools Brussels utilizes to promote democratic developments abroad are in line with what Manners regards to be normative behavior as they center on argumentation, persuasion, and norm diffusion. Yet, other dimensions also include more coercive aspects and as such may go beyond the normativism as envisaged by the Normative Power Europe framework. Consequently, to fully answer this paper's main question, we call on further research to be conducted. We believe that particularly empirical research into the approach the European Union has taken vis-à-vis particular countries and regions could help to establish whether the EU acts in accordance with what it is. The brief discussion on the EU's approach towards ASEAN presented in the final part of this contribution needs to be regarded as a first -and preliminary -attempt at this.
